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THE APPLICATION OF THE HARE SYSTEM IN
TASMANIA,
BY
"W. Jethro Brown, M.A., LL.D. (Cantab )
The fate of the Hare system constitutes one of the most remark-
able incidents in the history of representative government. Mr
Hare's treatise, " The Election of Representatives," was
published in 1859. It claimed to have discovered a remedy for
some of the most serious of the evils to which Democracy is
subject, and almost immediately received an attention not un-
worthy of the capacity of the writer and the magnitude of the
problems discussed. In 1860 the celebrated Henry Fawcett was
responsible for the publication, " Mr Hare's Keform Bill Simplified
and Explained." In the following year there appeared the
" Bfpresentative Government " of John Stuart Mill. The latest
advocate spoke in no uncertain tone : —" Mr Hare's scheme
has the almost unparalleled merit of carrying out a great principle
of government in a manner approaching to ideal perfection as
regards the special object in view, while it attains incidentally
several other ends, of scarcely inferior importance. . . . Such
and so numerous are its advantages that they place it among the
very greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice
of government." Such commendation, where it failed to evoke the
enthusiasm of the reformer, should at least have aroused the
interest of the citizen. No champion came forward to defend
the older system ; many of the evils which the new was designed
to remedy were becoming increasingly grave. If we attach to
such circumstances the importance they deserve, the issue must
appear surprising. Thirty-five years after the publication of Mill's
treatise, when the Hon. A. I. Clark, Attorney-General of Tasmania,
introduced a Bill to apply the Hare system to city constituencies
he could appeal to no precedent in the Parliamentary experience of
English-speaking peoples!
Weighed in the balance and found wanting I The conclusion
seems irresistible but it is not supported by facts. Neither
experience nor argument has condemned the Hare system. To
what circumstances, then, may we attribute its ill fortune ? Not to
the objections which have been urged, for these are commonly
but the after-thoughts which justify an argument founded in
prejudice. Even where they are serious they are not unanswer-
able. The sDlution of the mystery is rather to be found in two
facts, of which one is a weakness of human nature, and the other
a satire on party government. In the first place the plan of Mr
Hare suggests innovation. In the second place it is one of those
innovations which share the fate of the inconstant lover ; by
affecting all parties it secures the allegiance of none. It might
be added as a third explanation that the most serious of the
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evils it claims to correct are only beginning to receive adequate
recognition. Each of these facts would admit of illustration and
proof. But it is not so much the object of this paper to attack or
to defend the Hare sytem, as to give an exposition of its applica-
tion to this colony. The Bill of 1896 has become law, and it
includes several important modifications upon the proposals of Mr
Hare, which should be of more than local interest. Before
attempting their consideration, it may be well to indulge the
curiosity of the uninitiated by a statement of the merits which
have been claimed for the system whose defects the Tasmanian
modifications are designed to remedy.
The determination of constituencies by reference to geo-
graphical considerations, is at once the great aversion of Mr Hare
and the most conspicuous trait of the usual system. In substitution,
he proposes the determination of constituencies by voluntary
association. The tie by local contiguity is to be superseded i>y
the bond of kinship—kinship not of blood but of ideas ! The
great law of progress, defined by Maine as from status to
contract, already abundantly illustrated in the sphere of private
law, is to find a new illustration in the domain of Jus Publicum.
Every constituency is to be a partnership " in which there are to
be no sleeping partners, much less partners repudiating 8nd pro-
testing against the acts of the rest and yet unable to extricate
themselves. . . Full scope will be given to every generous
sentiment by which men may be drawn together. Devotion to a
great principle, regard for an illustrious name, affection for an
ancient house, admiration of worthy deeds, attachment to a
particular neighbourhood, love of country or of class, community
of feeling, harmony of taste, may all form so many occasions
of concord, and create innumerable circles, binding together in
society all varieties of rank and station."* But how is this
unanimity to be attained ? If the electors are left to their
own devices, attempts at the formation of voluntary con-
stituencies may end in a Parliament of party leaders. To avoid
such a contingency it is necessary to establish a quota by
dividing the number of voters by the number of seats. Who-
ever obtains the quota is elected, and any excess vote recorded
in his favor is given to the next preference of the voter. This
simple plan of transferring the vote is also followed in cases
where the candidate at the head of the list has no apparent
chance of election. As nothing is to be gained by transferring a
vote to a candidate who is already elected or excluded, " next
preference " must be understood to mean invariably, next available
preference. Such refinements need not perplex the elector who is
only required to express his choice by placing the numbers
1, 2, 3, etc., opposite the names of favored candidates.
However, we may differ in estimating the importance of the
fact, it must be admitted that such a system secures equity
of representation. The Legislature represents the opinion
of the country, with an approach to ideal fidelity; its members are
the representatives of the people—not of the chance majorities of
arbitrarily formed electorates. It is not easy to doubt the fairness
of such an arrangement. " The electors are the dispersed in-
habitants of an extensive and populous kingdom, possessing
*Hare; " Kepresentative Government," pp 38-9.
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knowledge and powers of thought infinitely varied and diffused
;
and to expect that the electoral forms of a rude and illiterate age
will gather for the national benefit the fruit of this expanded
intelligence, is as reasonable as to suppose that the vast manu-
facturing results of to-day could be produced by the primitive
loom and the hammer. To succeed in this work it is indispensable
that every eleetor should have the widest field of choice and the most
extensive sphere for co-operation." Thus Mr Hare. The unfairness
of the present system in England has been sufficiently established
in the publications of Sir John Lubbock. In 1886, the actual
voting strength in the constituencies was—Unionists, 319 ; Home
Rulers, 320 ; the actual voting strength in the House of Commons
was—Unionists, 394; Home Rulers, 275. The majority, which
should have been 29 was 119. Again, in 1895, the Conservative-
Unionist majority should have been 72 insead of 152. The in-
justice is more glaring where a minority of the electors return a
majority of the representatives. This may happen without the
aid of the mystical gerrymander. In the Canton Ticino the
more numerous party, as a result of its concentration in particular
districts, found itself in a minority ir the Representative Chamber.
It is a significant circumstance that a Reform was only secured
by a Revolution.
Apart from the general question of fairness, equity of
representation means representation of minorities. It would seem
almost superfluous to insist upon the importance of this fact.
The national welfare dermoids the possibility of sustained conflict.
If we would have the wise rule of the strong, we must provide for
the sustained opposition of the weak. Should victory put an end
to strife the days of good government are numbered. For what
can we hope in an age of Democracy, if the tendency of political
life is towards the extinction of minorities ? Yet the reality of
this tendency must appear indisputable. The organisation of
Labour is incomplete, but it will not always remain so. When
the transitional stage is past, what can prevent the Labour Vote
from carrying the election in every constituency? Yet it would
be an unhappy day for the people when education and intelligence
were excluded from a just share in the representation of the
country ; or when the infinitely varied character of the national
life found no correspondence in the National Parliament. No
one claims that the minority should rule ; but it must be heard.
Ultimately, all questions must be decided accordingto the wisdom
of the Parliamentary majority ; but the decision should be
made under conditions which ensure an adequate expression to the
opinion of the minority. Light is the best policeman within as
well as beyond the precincts of our Legislatures. It must
never be forgotten thai the dilemma of the future is not whether
the few or the many shall rule, but whether the sway of
the majority shall be absolute or qualified.
Equity of representation constitutes but the first of those
merits, which a disinterested advocacy nny claim for the Hare
System. The judgment of the impartial, as well as the
expectations of the sanguine, may well indulge the hope of a
deeper and more general interest in the politics of the country
.
There are few who will question the reality or the extent of the
evil of popular indifference, the fatal results which must follow
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from voting without reflection, judgment without deliberation,
or, worst of all, from that spirit which attempts to justify or
excuse a selfish isolation. Does the scheme of Mr Hare hold out
a reasonable hope of remedying such evils ? I believe it does.
The virtual disfranchisement of the minority in each constituency
is a most conspicuous evil of the present system, and one which
must too frequently condone the indifference of the elector. When
the stronger party is well organised, the disfranchisement of the
weaker party acquires a prospect of disagreeable permanency.
Under the Hare method of voting, the extinction of the minority
ceases. Every elector must have a representative in Parliament.
No longer need he console himself with the hope, often faint and
illusory, that unfair losses in some constituencies will be compen-
sated by unfair gains in others. Such a consideration suggests a
fact of great importance. If equity of representation strengthen
the interest of the elector where he is weak, must it not affect him
where he is strong ? By the zeal of the minority we may judge
the energy and often the prudence of the majority. Bat it is not
from the stimulus of a constant rivalry alone, that we may venture
to predict a new and deeper interest in political questions At a
recent election in this colony, two questions excited the interest
and divided the allegiance of the electors—Tattersall's and the
Income Tax. Electors often refused to vote rather than return
a candidate who, thougb^he represented their views on the income
tax, regarded with complacency the revenue derived from
Tattersall's. This is an evil of the system—not a vice in the voter
;
and it is equally common and pernicious. Under the Hare scheme,
the electors can plead no such excuse for inaction. The choice is
sufficiently liberal to gratify the most fastidious taste. While
human nature remains unaltered, there remains a third reason
for connecting the proposed method of voting and a deepening of
political interest. I allude to the circumstance that the classifica-
tion of a Dumber of candidates in an order of merit affords some
occasion for the display of a useful vanity. The elaborate
discussions which took place in this colony at an election just held
under the Hare system, suggest a study no less suggestive to the
thoughtful than engaging to the curious. The arguments were
not always distinguished by exceptional intelligence or an excep-
tional integrity ; but the interest was phenomenal. " Who should
be first ? Who second ?": etc. He is no true friend to liberty
who does not place a high value upon such discussions.
Mr Hare claimed for his system that it would lessen the evils,
if not remove the causes, of political corruption. The arguments
by which this claim is supported are not always convincing ; but
they are invariably respectable, and in one case c inclusive,
When it is open to no one to effect a sale of his constitueney by
turning the scale at an election, the obstacles to bribery
must be materially increased. For this reason, as well as for
others which have already engaged our attention, one may indulge
the hope of a more virtuous legislature. The hope becomes
stronger when reflection has weighed those independent|grounds by
which it is justified. The unrestricted freedom of choice favors
the nomination of intelligence and probity. Parties, anxious to
retain or to recover the confidence of the country, must bind the
allegiance of their followers by the nomination of theacceptable
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—the wise, the good, or at least the strong. Bat the freedom of
choice affects the character of the Legislature in a manner more
direct and more effective ; it fosters a spirit of independence, since
a candidate can spurn a dishonest compliance whenherelies upsn
the electors of a colony. No longer compelled to humour the
several sections of a single constituency, he is freed from a
disagreeable dilemma—so c jmmon and so demoralising ! Avoiding
alike the mean subterfuge and the fatal avowal, he relies for
support upon the diversity of his electorate. In such respects,
a comparison of the Hare system and the Referendum suggests a
fact of some importance. The Referendum is the natural resource
of a people perplexed by the domination of a corrupt or unrepre-
sentative Legislature. But the reference to the popular vote
implies a diminution of Parliamentary responsibility, and may,
therefore, aggravate those evils whose effects it is designed to
correct. The Hare system seeks, by improving the character of
the Legislature, to remove the causes of the evil.
This seems the proper place to consider the argument of
Bagehot that the Hare system is inconsistent with the indepen-
dence of Parliament ; that a voluntary constituency would be a
Church with tenets, and would, therefore, reserve the despotism in
its own hands. This argument is fast losing whatever importance
might once have attached to it. The difference between the
candidate elected under the Hare system and one elected under
the usual system, is not that the latter is the more independent,
but that the former is bound to a constituency whose general
sentiments he represents, and not to one whose general sentiments
he represents in part but must respect in toto.
I have spoken of the merits of an equality of representation ;
of a new and deeper interest in political life ; of politics made
purer and of a Parliament made more worthy At this stage
it might seem proper to attempt a systematic consideration of the
objections which have engaged the attention of Constitutional
writers. Such objections, however, may mors conveniently be
discussed in connection with the modifications adopted in this
colony for the purpose of weakening, if not destroying, their force.
It will be seen that a compromise has not always been effected
without some diminution ol the merits of Mr Hare's scheme. But
I think in each case there is a great and obvious gain. Of the
modifications tc which allusion is made, the first has been generally
associated in this colony with the name of Sir John Lubbock. It
must be regarded as a complete answer to the objection, so
commonly urged and so difficult to impugn, that the Hare system
is too complicated to be practicable. The student of Mr Hare's
treatise is often tempted to regard the task of the returning
officer as beyond the reach of mortals. In the application of
the method to a whole country, voting as a single constituency,
and returning not less than 100 representatives, the formation of
voluntary constituencies might well involve all the evils of
a constituency - making trade. In the fasmanian Bill, the
method has been confined to city constituencies. These
return six or four members. Though the constituencies
might be larger with advantage, the present arrange-
ment has one very obvious merit ; the argument from
complexity only remains as the frail support of those whose
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prejudice, or whose indifference, has rendered them impervious
to reason. The simplicity, both of the process of voting and of the
general principle of the Act, is clearly shown by the following
instructions suggested by Miss Spence of Mouth Australia :—
"1. There are here 12 candidates, six tobe elected.
2. Vote by numbering candidates in the order of your choice,
that is to say :—Place 1 to the left of the candidate you like
best. Place 2 to the left of the name of the candidate you
like second best. Place 3 to the left of the name of the
candidate you like next best, and so on.
3. Vote for not less than three names.
4. The same number must not be placed against more than one
name.
5. The numbers must be'placed opposite the names.
Note.—Your vote will be used for one candidate according to
your preference. If the candidate you like most, either (a)
Does not need your vote (has enough votes to elect him without
your vote), or (b) cannot use your vote (has so few votes that
he cannot possibly be selected) ; your vote will be transferred to
the candidate you like next best, as shown by your numbers,,
and used—notwasted."
The work of the returning officer, while less simple than that
of the elector, demands no exceptional qualifications. He need
display the intelligence of a clerk— scarcely more.
The limitation of tho Hare System to districts returning a
small number of members has the additional merit of removing
objections based on an alleged encouragement of faddism. It
is difficult to believe that sincerely Democratic principles can
sanction the exclusion of electors from representation, simply be-
cause they have the misfortune to advocate opinions which the
great majority regard with aversion. Yet the cause of pro-
portional representation has often suffered on this account.
Whatever importance must be attached to the objection, it ceases
to apply to that modification of the Hare System which has been
adopted in this colony. In a constituency returning only six
members, the electors who are strong enough to secure a repre-
sentative may claim to be exempt from the imputation of
singularity. The minorities which the Act encourages must
always be respectable. If it is further objected that the neces-
sity for constant compromise destroys the consistency of party
government, even where only respectable minorities are repre-
sented, the retort is simple. Compromise is equally necessary
under both systems ; under the old, it is effected at the hustings,
in all the excitement and turmoil of an election ; under the new,
it is effected in the relatively calm and judicial atmosphere of
the Legislature.
A perusal of the instructions already mentioned suggests a
further peculiarity. The industry of the elector must be equal to
the task of voting for three candidates. The limit may be raised
when experience of the system forbids the excuse of novelty. The
elector whose capacity or whose interest is taxed by the nomina-
tion of three candidates, fails to influence the election if those for
whom he votes have a quota without his assistance; or, indeed,
if their need be so extreme that his assistance is unavailing.
The elector who pleads a fastidious taste, as an excuse for a
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limited ?ele ctic.D, must remember that it is possible to classify
candidates in an order of aversion as well as in an order of pre-
fererce. .An entirely different line of argument was taken by one
opponent of the Jbill, a gentleman of much zeal and some origi-
nality. " Compel an elector to vote for three candidates and it will
often end in his choosing as second and third preferences, candi-
dates who cannot be raised up as rivals to his first preference.
This must prove fatal to the success of the Act.'' The statement
is only quoted as illustrating the character of the opposition
to which the Bill was occasionally subjected. It would be difficult
to suggest a more felicitous example of unreasoning aversion.
Second and third preferences can never be employed for the
purposes of defeating first preferences; until the fate of the latter
has beea determined, no reference to the former is permissible.
The distribution of the surplus votes is a subject of great
importance, and one which remains for consideration. The method
adopted in the Tasmanian Bill constitutes its chief claim to the
considertion of Home and Foreign statesmen. One may only
judge of the value of the means which have been employed by
appreciating the difficulties which have been overcome. If a,
candidate obtain 2000 votes when the quota is fixed at 1000,
1000 ballot papers are available for distribution among the
candidates whose names are marked 2. The result of the distri-
bution varies according to the principle which determines the
appropriation of the papers of the favored candidate. If
an analysis of second preferences yield 1000 for Y and a like
number for Z, it would be within the power of the leturning
officer to effect the election of whichever candidate he preferred.
This element of chance has been declared the only really for-
midable obstacle to the practical application of Mr Hare's
system.* How has the obstacle been overcome in the Tasmanian
Act P Mr Clark has suggested a plan at once so simple and
so just, that the fact of its novelty must appear incredible. X
has a surplus ; bow is it to be distributed ? JSot indiscriminately,
nor according to the caprice of the returning officer ; but in a
proportion determined by reference to the second votes on the
whole of X's papers ; or, as was at first suggested, on the whole
of the electorate. For the purposes of this calculation, a
candidate marked 3 is credited with a second vote if the candidate
marked 2 had obtained his quota before the distribution in
question had been commenced. In the case already suggested,
of the lOOOexcess votes, ST and Z alike secure 500. In one re-
spect the plan involves a slight departure from the scheme of Mr
Hare, who proposed to confine the influence of the elector to a
single transferable vote. In the case already suggested, X's
constituents not only return their chosen candidate, but also
have a voice in the distribution of his surplus votes. Such a
voice might almost be described as the fraction of a vote.
While it is difficult to see any serious objection to this
departure, its merit is clear. The element ot chance ceases
to exist.
So far we have only considered the case of a surplus arising
from the first count, and, therefore, without the aid of votes
transferred from other candidates. After every surplus of this
* " Essays and Lectures," H. and M. G. Faweett, 1872
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"kind has been distributed, it may be found that fresh surpluses
have been crea'ed. How are these to be distributed P We have
supposed a case in which, as a result of the distribution of X's
surplus. 500 voting papers go to Y. If Y only requires 400 to
complete his quota, what is to bs d >ne with the excess ? Is the
returning officer to take the 100 papers on the top of Y's lot and
distribute them according to third preferences ? Thi9 would
leave too mach to chance, or to the discretion of the returning
officer. In pursuance of a principle already illustrated, the Act
requires the distribution of the l'O excess votes in a proportion
determined by reference to third preferences on the whole 500
papers taken from the box of X.
If as the result of the foregoing counts, an insufficient
number of candidates have obtained a quota, the candidate who
has secured the lowest number of votes is excluded from the poll ;
and his ballot papers are then transferred to the candidates whom
the electors have chosen in substitution, Whenever the next
preference of the voter is a candidate already elected, the name
is cancelled and the papers are passed on to a later preference
If any candidate gain a surplus as a result of this distr.bution,
it is to be redistributed in a p-oportion determined by reference to
the next preferences on the whole of the ballot papers previously
transferred to him. The process of elimination, occasionally
alternated with the distribution of a surplus, is continued until
the nnmber of candidates does not exceed the number of vacancies.
Ihe principles underlying the Tasmanian Electoral Act have
been explained with studious brevity. The courtesy of my
audience may excuse, if their curiosity does not solicit, an
account of the election held under its provisions. It will be suffi-
cient to speak of the district of Hobart. Consistently with the
anticipations of the Legislature, the occasion was honored by a
display of interest equally remarkable for its diffusion and its
•nsity. For ten hours the crowd barred the approaches to the
polling booth. The proceedings were enlivened by the usual
humours of the election day : such phrases as "fiabid on the Hare
rated alluring opportunities for distinction, requiring
e intelligence in the wit and less in the auditors. The mode
of distributing the surplus afforded endless occasion for discussion
and mi- tanding, and for that humour which, as it was un-
conscious, we mny perhaps impute to genius. "It all comes to this,"
said ODe elector, " when Clark has all the votes he needs, any other
vote for him goes to the next man on the list who needs it most."
One dialogue deserved to be specially recorded. ''The practical
commo-??nse men tell me the old system is the best." " But I
expect the practical commonsense men of whom you speak do
no understand tne Hare System." ' That's so ; tliey said as much;
but still they are practical commonsense men, and that is sufficient
for me." Such remarks illustrate, with admirable felicity, the
character of the most serious opposition which the advocate of
the Ha rm mist encounter. They further illustrate the
folly of efforts to instruct the electors in the minutise of a Bill
with whose general principles they are unfamiliar. As Mr Hare
remarked in his treatise, a passenger is satisfied to travel by
the express though ignorant of the details of the steam engine.
The justice of the parallel is admirable, and it is a matter for
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regret that its lesson has been so neglected in the politics of
this Colony. Instead of instruction in the broad principles of pro-
portional representation, its general fairness and distinctive merits,
the elector has been perplexed by theprocesses involved in the
distribution of a surplus. For this reason, among others, the list
of informal votes was large. Even the prophets fell ; a candidate
for Parliamentary honors, deeply versed in the lore of proportional
distribution, rendered his vote informal by scoring out the names
of opposing candidates — the method formerly adopted. His
success at the election may be taken to prove the indulgence of
fate.
At 6.30 pm, soon after the prescribed time for closing the
poll, the process of counting the votes began. The ballot-boxes
were brought to the Beturning Officer, the ballot papers were
removed, unfolded, and taken to the scrutineers, who began to
sort them for the first count Attached to each of the scrutineers
tables, there was a box with several compartments—one for each
candidate, one fordoubtful and one for invalid papers. The work of
the scrutineers consisted in taking the papers one by one and
calling out the names of the candidates marked 1, and placing
them in the compartments appropriated to the respective candi-
dates. Two clerks registered the vote on their recording sheets.
Finally, these recording sheets were tabulated and handed to Mr
Johnston, the Government Statistician and presiding genius of the
election. When the various numbers had been totalled, the
result of the first, or primary votes, became known. The totals
of Mr Johnston were checked by the Returning Officer, who had
previously settled the destination of doubtful papers. It was
found that the total number of valid votes was 2745. As there
were six seats, the quota was fixed at 457. Only one of the candi-
dates (Sir Philip Fysh) obtained a quota as the result of the first
count. As the primary votes of this candidate amounted to 501,
there was a surplusof 44 for distribution among remaining candi-
dates. After the whole 501 ballot papers had been given to the
scrutineers for the purpose of estimating second preferences, it
was found that Bradley claimed 41, Clark 304, Cox 2, Crisp
38, Dillon 9, Fulton 1, Hiddiestone 30, Mulcahy 42, Page 19, Paton
4, and St. Hill 10. A sum in simple proportion followed. If
Bradley is entitled to 41 votes outof 501, to how many is he entitled
44x41
out of a surplus of 44 ? = 3J or, getting rid of the frac-
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tion, 4 The Returning Officer had then to take from Fysh's
box, any four ballot-papers on which Bradley was marked 2,
and to place them in Bradley's box. In this manner, but by
the aid of Fuller's spiral slide rule, the wholesurplus of 44 votes was
instantly distributed among the unelected candidates. This com-
pleted the second count. Had any candidate secured a surplus as
the result of this count, that surplus must have been distributed
in a proportion determined by reference to the third votes on the
whole of the ballot-papers he had received from Sir Phi'ip Fysh.
As a matter of fact.no additional candidate had secured a quota,
and it remained to begin the process of excluding lowest candidates.
The first victim was Mr Cox, whose 33 votes were now distributed
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among second preferences, except where Sir Philip Fysh was
second, in which case it went to the third preference. No candi-
date gained a surplus as a result of this count. Mr Fulton, who
was lowest on the poll at. this stage, was then excluded, and his 122
papers were distributed [among the candidates whose fate yet
remained uncertain. The result of this distribution was to raise
Mr Bradley's total to 483. As this involved a surplus of 26, that
surplus had to bedistri buted in a proportion determined by
reference to the next preferences on the whole votes transferred
to Bradley from other candidates, i.e , from Fysh, Cox, or Fulon.
The process of elimination, alternated with the occasional distri-
bution of a surplus, was continued until only six candidates
remained. These were then declared elected. Itwill be seen
from the accompanying table, on pp. (J2, that only four were
successful in obtaining a quota.
It will be interesting to compare with the foregoing, a table
for the compilation of which I am indebted to the courtesy of
the Government Statistician. Ike table shows how different
would have been the result if the cumulative method had been
adopted.
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classi fication on the principle of least dislike. Nor does the number
of " exhaust papers " offer occasion for serious criticism. In
many cases such papers were useless because candidates whose
names they bore were elected without their assistance. The
number of informal votes was sufficiently large to excite the
hostility of the censorious ; yet it was not larger than is usual
on the occasion of a change in the mode of voting; indeed, the
percentage was much lower than at the recent elections for the
Federal Convention. In the city of Hobart, the informal votes
amounted to 105 ; 52 had been guilty of extra marking, especially
of scoring out the names of rejected candidates ; 20 had marked
each of their chosen candidates 1, instead of 1, 2, 3, etc.; 16
had failed to mark at least three candidates , four had omitted
to observe a proper sequence in their numbers ; three had written
the figures between the names ; three were illegible ; two had
contributed their signatures ; two had marked all their candidates
2 instead of 1, 2, 3, etc.; one had given his numbers in writing;
and one had scrawled over the whole of his paper, apparently
to express an abhorence of the system.
If we regard the Act as a whole, I am not aware that ex-
perience has exposed its defects. Whatever objections a captious
criticism may discover, there is, perhaps, but one which requires
serious attention. If X receives 2000 primary votes and the
quota be 1000, the resulting surplus is distributed in a proportion
determined by reference to secondary preferences on the whole
of X's 2000 votes. Under sucha mode of distribution nothing is
left tolchance or to the discretion of the returning officer. But
let us go a step further—let us suppose that Y has 800 primary
votes, and that he receives 600 from X's surplus. In that case
he obtains his quota and 400 excess votes. How are these
excess votes to be distributed ? Several modes suggest them-
selves. The returning officer may take the 400 ballot papers
from the top of Y's box and pass them on to next preferences ; he
may do this after having first shuffled the whole of Y's papers
;
or, again, a 3 may exercise his own s^eet will upon them. The
objections to each of these courses is clear. But if the su*plus
of 400 is to be distributed according to a proportion, by re-
ference to what ballot papers is the proportion to be determined ?
The Act, apparently with the intention of simplifying the work of
the returning officer, answers " By reference to the 600 papers
transferred from X to Y." It will be at once seen that this intro-
duces the element of chance. We know that if Y gained 600 of
X's suplus of 1000, he must have been marked 2 on 6-10ths of X's
total number of primary votes. 2000 x 6-10=1200. The actual
600 papers transferred from X to Y were to be chosen at random
from the whole of the 1200 papers on which Y was marked 2.
The proportion among the third votes of one chance selection
from this 1200, might be very different from the proportion among
the third votes of ar.other chance selection. If the returning
officer choose " to take a hand," the variations may be increased.
All such objections may be avoided by distributing Y's surplus
of 400 in a proportion determined by reference to the whole of the
1200 papers, i.e
,
the whole of the X Y papers. It might save time
if the returning officer, in transferring the 600 papers which con-
stituted Y's share of X's surplus, were to preserve the same
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proportion of third votes on transferred papers, as existed on the
whole 1800 X Y papers. In the distribution of Y's surplus of
400 it would then be sufficient to make a calculation on the basis
of the pajcrs transferred frcrn Xto Y. It may be interesting to
note that the distribution of Y's surplus might also be determined
by reference (1) to the third votes on the whole of X's original
papers ; (2) to the third votes on the total number of X's original
papers taken together with the sr eond votes on the total number
of Y's original papers ; (3) to the third votes of the whole elec-
torate. The evils of complexity form an answer to the arguments
by which these alternatives can be supported. Any proposal to
effect a distribution by reference to third votes on the whole elec-
torate is open to an additional objection ; it would give an undue
influence to electors voting according to prescribed ticket. The
objection would appiy with peculiar force to any proposal to
distribute surpluses arising as a result of the first count in a
proportion determined by reference to the second votes on the
whole electorate.
In conclusion, I crave your indulgence, while directing your
attention to the dreaded reproach of innovation. Professor
Freeman has observed how often those great reforms, which mark
the progress of our race, have involved a return to the traditions,
institutions, or ideas of an earlier time. The barons who wrung
from a reluctant monarch the Great Charter of our liberties, only
sought to record and to secure the acknowledged birthrights of
Englishmen. The Parliament of De Montfort was a device for
restoring the freedom of the Teuton. For the primitive assembly
of the tribe there was substituted the Representative Parliament
of a nation ; for appearance in person the new conditions re-
quired an appearance through chosen deputies. Yet the great
principle of the right of the people to share in the work of
Government underlay both institutions. Thus it happened that
the privileges which English forefathers had enjoyed in the
forest of Ancient Germany, but which had been sacrificed in the
process of migration and national consolidation, were to be regained
in the great and painful crises of a later century.
If we consider the characteristics of the Hare system in
connection with the Parliament of the thirteenth century, I
believe we shall arrive at a startling conclusion. Mr Hare sought
to introduce an organic element into our system of representation.
The new constituencies were designed to be united by allegiance
to one object, to be animated by one spirit. I believe that
here again in the history of our race, we may discover, under the
semblance of innovation, the reality of an ancient practice. This
is no place to justify &uch a generalisation by an adequate induction
from the facts of mediaeval history. Yet the interest and the
importance of the enquiry may justify an illustration of its mean-
ing. In the first place, the mediaeval Parliament respresented the
estates of the realm—the Clergy, the Baronage, and the Commons.
These were not arbitrary divisions of the State, but organic
parts of.the Nation. The means by which they acquired the reality
and the consciousness of internal cohesion, form one of the most
engrossing chapters in the national annals. The facts of history
lend no encouragement to the suggestion of a residuary class
jn the estate of the Commons. The third estate represented tno
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alliance of the communities of the shires with the communities of
the towns, and was the result of many causes, amonfc which we may
distinguish the appreciations of common dangers, the inducements
of royal policy, and the similarity of the processes employed in
the exercise of political rights.
8tarting from the established fact that the mediaeval Parlia-
ment was an assemblage of estates, we have yet to enquire the
character of the constituencies of the third estate. Were they,
too, organic ? I confess I see no answer to this question but the
affirmative. The representatives of the Commons were the deputies
of the shires and the towns. Each shire was a unit of the nation,
bo and together by its common court, its common judicial and
administrative organisation. The County was an organised body
of men — a communitas—almost a kingdom in minature ! If we
turn to the towns of the middle ages, despite the infinite variety
of their customs, the reality of their organic character seems
indisputable. Nor should we be altogether unprepared for this
conclusion. When we remember that they were compelled to
struggle for their charters, their liberties, and often for their
existence, against the attacks of neighboring barons and the
tyranny of a ubiquitous monarch ; that, as yet, the centralising
influences of the .Railway and the Press were unknown ; that, as
yet, geographical constituencies were not divided ioto hostile
camps by the contests of national parties - when we remember
these facts, we are prepared to find in the town of the middle ages,
a community of life, thought, and feeling, unattainable under the
complex conditions of modern society. Nor are we disappointed.
The superiority of the old over the tew in this respect, is well
expressed in the 'writings of a brilliant essayist. Each town,
writes Frederick Harrison, had its own patron saint, its own special
church, and its own feudal patron, its corporate life, its own
privileges, traditions, and emblems. On the other hand, the
modern city is almost bereft of any religious, patriotic, or artistic
character as a whole. There is much public spirit—in certain parts,
a love of beauty, taste, and cultivation of a special kind. But it
is not embodied in the city; it is not associated with the city; it
does not radiate from the city. A typical industrial city of modern
times has no founder, no traditional heroes, no patrons Or saints,
no emblem, no history, no definite circuit. It is ever changing,
loose in organisation, casual in form*
If we attach any importance to the foregoing facts, it must
affect our attitude towards the reproach of innovation. Our
methods may be new, but the principle is ancient. It is no longer
possible to combine the organic element with the geographical
constituency. Which are we to retain ? Ordinary usage answers
this question in one way, and Mr Hare in another. I believe there
are a few more important questions of to-day than this, and that
few deserve a more immediate attention on the part of statesmen
and thinkers.
* "The Meaning of History," pp. 250. In the Model Parliament of 1295,
there were 74 Knights representing the Shires and 232 Citizens and
Burgesses representing the Towns.
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